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MORAL REPAIR AND ITS LIMITS 
I MARGARET URBAN WALKER 
I N TONI MORRISON'S novel Jazz, one might want to say, a man gets away with a murder.) Joe Trace, fifry, dazed and driven by the rejection of his 
eighteen-year-old girlfriend, Dorcas, hunts her down at a party and shoots 
her. This is Harlem in the 1920S. No one wants to deal with "helpless lawyers 
or laughing cops" (j 4), and an ambulance called does not bother to speed 
to the scene, so Dorcas bleeds to death of her wound in front of her friend 
Felice. Joe's wife Violet invades Dorcas's funeral in a fury to try to cut her 
rival's young dead face, but finally she stands a picture of the murdered girl 
on the mantle of their apartment, poisoning the space with grief and re-
proach, yet joining herself and Joe in nighttime vigils of staring at the 
young face. Joe cries by the window incessantly for months, no longer the 
dapper and trusted salesman, while Violet stares into melting malteds in 
reveries of indignation, seared by Joe's betrayaL 
Violet got the picture on the mantle from Alice Manfred, the aunt who 
raised Dorcas from a child. Alice was astonished when Violet-the wife of 
Dorcas's killer and the woman who ruined her funeral-appeared forlornly 
at her door, but after a month, Alice let Violet in and comes to wait for 
Violet's visits, in which "something opened up" (f 83) as they talk jaggedly 
abolltAlice's dead niece and Violet's husband who killed her. Alice, a seam-
stress, begins to mend Violet's ragged clothes; or Alice irons and Violet 
watches. When Alice tells Violet impatiently "You got anything left to you to 
love, anything at all, do it" (flU) and puts her iron down hard, she burns 
a hole right through a shirtwaist, and suddenly they rock with laughter 
"More complicated, more serious than tears" (J II3). 
Three months after the killing, Violet takes the picture of Dorcas down 
fi-om the mantle, and Joe sobs more quietly. Dorcas's friend, Felice, comes 
around to find a ring Dorcas borrowed and instead cries for the first time 
about Dorcas's dying "like a fool" (j 205) when no one seemed to care except 
about the blood that soaked the mattress. Joe and Violet and Felice tal(e to 
each other, although she is embarrassed to watch these old folks start to 
dance to music drifting through a window. In spring, Joe takes another job 
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and life resumes. In the opening paragraph of the Story, Violet, in a fury 
after assaulting the dead Dorcas, let all her pet birds out in the winter's cold 
to freeze, including the parrot that said, "I love you"; in the final pages, 
Violet nurtures a newly bought sickly bird by nourishing it with music 
from the rooftops. Joe and Violet sleep during the day, go for walks, tell 
each other stories, and huddle afternoons peacefully under a worn quilt 
they dream of replacing with a powder blue blanket with satin trim. Alice 
Manfred, furious at Joe Trace's impunity but shamed at her own inability 
to protect her niece Dorcas, found "clarity" unburdened with courtesy in 
Violet's uninvited visits; she moved back to Springfield, Massachusetts. 
At the end of the novel, the narrator speaks about her surprise: she 
thought she knew these "people" she watched and waited to describe, but 
instead found that she had to follow them to a place she did not expect: 
So I missed it altogether. I was sure one would kill the other. I waited for it 
so I could describe it. I was so sure it would happen. That the past was an 
abused record with no choice but to repeat itself at the crack and no power 
on earth could lift the arm that held the needle. 1 was so sure, and they 
danced and walked all over me. Busy, they were, busy being original, com-
plicated, changeable-human, I guess you'd say, while I was the predict-
able one .... 
It never occurred to me that they were thinking other thoughts, feeling 
other feelings, putting their lives together in ways I never dreamed of. 
(J 220-21) 
The narrator seems to have waited for the fitting comeuppance, for the 
score to be settled, for justice, natural, human, or poetic, to exact retribu-
tion, or at least a steep price. A lot of us have been waiting for it, too. 
This tale haunts and disturbs me in a particular way. It is about the after-
math of violence of many types that people survive. But it is not only Joe 
Trace's unavenged killing of Dorcas that unbalances the wishful equation 
that fits a crime to a punishment in the logic of a certain kind of justice, for 
I have left most of the novel out in this description. The histories Morrison 
unfolds for these people show how love, loss, and violence echo within lives 
and down generations, for these histories are knotted with the violence of 
racism from slavery times on. Joe was abandoned by an unknown father 
and a mother who ran and hid like a wild thing in the woods. Violet's 
mother was poor and alone with too many children when her husband was 
run out of the county by white landowners for joining a party that claimed 
voting rights for blacks. She committed suicide, leaving Violet to be raised 
by her grandmother, True Belle, who as a slave had been forced to leave her 
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own children and husband behind to care for her young white mistress and 
the white woman's illegitimate son by a young black man. Dorcas's father 
was stomped to death and her mother burned in a St. Louis race riot. These 
histories do not explain the characters to us. Instead, they make them more 
vivid and yet more opaque to us, and to themselves, in the ways real people 
can be. But they show the terrifying incalculability of the wages of violent 
and englobing racism and of our inabili ties or refusals to pay them. Where, 
and to whom, does the equation that fits a crime ro a punishment apply 
here? 
I find myself moved to wonder and hope as Morrison shows some very 
broken lives repaired, rather than ruined. Still, I feel anxious and ashamed 
that 1 am moved by this, because in the story Dorcas has been killed by Joe. 
In the end, no one seems to speak for her. No one undertakes to exact a pay-
ment from her killer. Instead, some lives of some of the living are repaired. 
They are, against the odds, replenished with abilities to value life, to trust 
once more, to give care and pleasure again. The story strikes me as a parable, 
but what is the parable about? Is it about another toute to some resolution 
that ordinary justice also tries to achieve? Is it about the possibility that jus-
tice does not alone set the standards for repairing the fabric oflives torn by 
wrongdoing? Or does it force us to see that it is no accident who is apt to 
get justice and who is likely to be brought to it? The fuller story reminds us 
starldy that our sense of justice may fix insistently on some crimes and not 
others-on the murder of one girl by a lover, for example, bur not on the 
terror and cruelty and unnumbered murders of Africans and their descen-
dants in U.S. slavery and the continuing aftermath of racism that frames 
the lives and histories ofJoe, Violet, and Alice, as it does the lives and his-
tories of all Americans today. But it also follows the story of a handfu~ of 
panicular human beings, some of whose shattered relations are nursed and 
revived, as so often is not the case in the wake of violence. Is this moral repair? 
.Is what happened to and among Joe, Violet, and Alice an example of an 
Important moral possibility? 
Varieties of Moral Repair 
\'?fhat is "moral repair"? I use this phrase to refer to a familiar and unavoid-
able task human beings face. We need, over and over, to decide how to 
respond to wrongdoing, whether to ourselves or to others, and whether by 
o~rsel:es or by others. Moral philosophers in the twentieth centmy have 
often liked. to characterize ethics as answering the question "What ought I to d~" I' h' l' 
o. W 11c Itnp les a set of choices on a fresh page. Yet one of our recurrent 
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ethical tasks is better suggested by the question "What ought I (or we) to 
do now?" after the page is blotted or rom by our own or others' wrongdoing. 
I am interested here in understanding how responses to moral wrongs can 
be ways to repair and sustain morality itself. 
This sounds strange: how can "morality" be damaged or broken? I do 
not think we need to converge on a metaphysics of morals in order ro see 
just this: whether morality has its ultimate source and authority in a divine 
rule, a transcendent order, a natural law, or in the human mind or heart, the 
reality of morality in our lives-its importance and its grip, its mattering to 
us rather than seeming like just somebody else's rules-is something that 
we human beings must produce and sustain in the real times and spaces of 
human societies. People can lose their grip on even the most basic forms 
of decency if they are moved by lust, money, power, or fame; and we are 
reminded almost daily of what Sissela Bok has called the "vast and shame-
lessly organized hatreds" (44), the massacres, genocides, and terrors that 
have indelibly marked the century now just past. Less dramatically, our 
senses of value and responsibility can be dulled, eroded, disconnected. For-
tunately, they can also be confirmed and revived, even extended to people 
or situations to which we have not applied them before. Many are now 
consciolls to an unprecedented degree of discriminations and humiliations 
that limit or endanger lives, and the world-spanning discourse of human 
rights is heard more and more, even if it is largely unfulfilled. Old forms of 
responsibility can be eroded or strengthened, and new ones established and 
enforced. But senses of value and responsibility can only be shorn up, shifted, 
lost, or newly installed by us, that is, by many acts of many of us, or at least 
by enough of us at a particular place and time. We do this by doing what 
morality requires, by teaching our children and reminding each other of it. 
We also do this by the ways we respond ro the doing of what is not morally 
acceptable. We show what we will "stand for." 
So, whether moral standards are discovered or constructed, there is not 
much room for denying that it is up to us to give them body in social life. 
When moral standards are transgressed, the force and the strength of that 
body is tested. Our responses to wrongdoing place bets on how much wear 
and tear that body can take, and what will nourish and heal it, rather than 
sicken and wealzen it. Deciding what to do now may involve discerning what 
damages require emergency responses, strong remedies, or subtle adjust-
ments, and which are best left alone to fade away. Of course, I'm leaning on 
a metaphor here, the image of a living body with needs for maintenance 
and with points of vulnerability. Morality is not a physical organism. But 
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! Hi!- mOl'aliryas a living dimension of our social lives does not take care of itself, 
although we all rely enormously on it to take care of us--to be real and 
fbrcefld enough to prevent a lot of harm from coming our way And at many 
times, fur many of us, in ways large or small, this fails. 
Philosophical disCLlssions of responding to wrongdoing have been 
largdyabsorbed with discussions of blame and punishmenr. Punishment is 
one inJispensable response to wrongdoing: we inflict some measured and 
proportionate but unpleasant or painful treatment on the wrongdoer. Phi-
losophers, politicians, jurists, reformers, and penologists continue to debate 
what punishment as a social practice is about. The familiar rationales, which 
are not mutually exclusive, are retribution, deterrence, or rehabilitation: 
retribution requires harm or malice to be answered with something propor-
tionately unpleasant for the wrongdoer; incapacitation or deterrence makes 
ir impossible or unappealing for the wrongdoer or others to try this again; 
rehabilitation aims (0 do something constructive with wrongdoers that 
renders them fitter for law-abidingness, a thought no longer much in vogue 
in some places but very much alive in orhers.2 Parenrs, teachers, and all or 
us in many circumstances of daily lire are raced all the time with questions 
about whether to punish and why. 
Yet whatever is an occasion for punishmen t is just as much an occasion 
for other or additional responses to come into play.3 Friends let us down or 
play llS false; spOllses and lovers are unfaithful; partners fail to respect each 
other's needs or feelings; employers are unrair; associates are cruel; there are 
slights, insults, lies, indifference, aggression, or violence among us. It is im-
portant that we do not always think of punishing people when these things 
happen, although sometimes we do; these differem cases remind us of a lot 
of alternatives to punishment rnat in faer are :u\va)'::i' nkre: £5:.'f'l\O' ""f "'~':f\!, 
responses to wrongdoing exclude each other, while some can combine. 
We can let it go by accepting or forgetting. We can blame or reproach 
those responsible. We can demand that they acknowledge responsibility 
and wrongdoing, confirming our negative judgment. \YJe can resort to forms 
of public denunciation or censure. We can resorr to direct retaliation and 
paybacks, tit for tat. We might embark on more or less formal exclusion, 
ostracism, pushing wrongdoers to the margins of our personal, social, or 
public lives. If we are in a position to do it, we might impose punishment 
in the Llsual sense, a measured and representative penalty or reprisal. \Ve can 
also demand a show of remorse, repentance, or other reparative attitudes 
from those who have done wrong. And whether these are forthcoming, we 
might demand from them reparative acrs, like apology or penance, or acts 
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of restiturion or compensation, material or symbolic. Sometimes we decide 
w pardon or excuse, to accept either that the offense does not require redress, 
or that it is better to forego redressing it. Or we may continue to see redress 
as in order bur find reasons to be merciful in diminishing the response. 
Those who have been injured-and only those-have the option of forgiv-
ing. Often this means relinquishing the hostility or resentment they legiti-
mately feel toward the one who has wronged them, and it always involves 
foregoing some entitlements of the injured that would go hard on their 
injurer. Forgiveness may serve ends of reconciliation, where a prior relation 
has been ruptured; but even when we forgive we may decline to restore 
connections, and we sometimes forgive precisely in order to let go the con-
nection itself. Lack of acknowledgment of wrongdoing by wrongdoers and 
third parties is a torment for those who believe themselves wronged. In some 
cases, we feel a need to insist on a truth's being established "for the record," 
whether that record is the formal one ofhisrory books or the shared under-
standing of a friendship, an institution, or a marriage. Some wrongs call out 
for memorials or commemorations, which preserve the rebuke ro wrong-
doers, the digniry of victims, and a warning to others. Finally, we want, as 
we say, to prevent the wrong from being repeated; pathos lies in the fact 
that no actual wrong ever is repeated, any more than it can be undone.4 
I want ro use the term "moral repair" ro encompass punishment by sit-
uating it in a broader field of ways to address and redress wrongdoing that 
may replace punishment or combine with it. What they have in common is 
that they are all ways of responding to wrongs, not merely reacting to them; 
that is, they are attitudes and courses of action that people take up when a 
wrong has been done, whatever the nature and intensiry of their reactions. 
These responses address wrongs as wrongs, that is, as something that 
should not have happened, and for which someone is, more or less, respon-
sible. And they are supposed to do something precisely about that, to "set it 
right." So they involve at least two kinds of "fixing": they fix responsibility, 
that is, place it on certain actors, and they ny to address damage or harm 
done culpably by actors in some restorative way. The damage done is always 
specific to the particular wrong; but all wrongdoings are occasions when 
trust in our moral understandings, and the hope that we are trustworthy in 
honoring them, are threatened or broken. Moral repair aims at reinstating 
moral terms and replenishing our trust and hope in them and in ourselves. 
But there are quite a lot of ways we can do this, or try to. 
One of the aspects in Morrison's story that is beautiful and disturbing is 
that we see an ensemble of reactions to a murder, a paradigm of wrongdoing, 
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u6 and we see a recol1stellatiol1 of fractured relationships and broken spirits, a 
course of rages and griefs that runs itself through to the reclaiming of a living 
present, and future, with some hope. And this i.s some~hing, at l~ast one 
thing, we would like to see responses to wrongdoll1g achieve, especially for 
victims and often for wrongdoers (even more so when wrongdoers are our-
selves). Furthermore, Joe's killing of Dorcas is followed by his profound 
suffering and a virtually public exhibition of self-abasing remorse. Yet we 
are not sure we are seeing responses (rather than reactions) to the wrong that 
has been done in an attempt to set things right; or, we may wonder whether 
we are seeing the right responses. Nor are we sure how the tangled tragedies 
of family and racist violence Morrison weaves into the histories of these 
characters configure their sense of what wrongs can be righted and what 
crimes and betrayals are forgivable. More pointedly, what about our OWn 
senses of this? What wrongs do we, different readers, expect to be set right; 
what do we want forgiven, and what left alone? 
This is the ambiguity for me in this parable. Ambiguities such as this, 
however, do not arise only in stories. I turn now to a political response to 
systemic wrongdoing that has fascinated people around the world. It is not 
a parable, but it has been a kind of pageant that has moved people deeply 
even as it sparked intense debate. 
Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa 
South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) arose from a 
strained and expedient political compromise. Yet it has evolved as a partic-
ularly ambitious and hopeful project of deliberate moral repair of a society 
moving from systematic race oppression and state violence to democracy. In 
using the South African example as a concrete rderence point, I hope I honor 
the importance of South Mrica's project, although I could not try here to do 
justice to the complexity of its problems nor to the details of its still unfolding 
story. The South African process reveals ambiguities in the concept of moral 
repair and conflicts in the practice of moral repair as a real social process. 
Following South Africa's first all-race elections in 1994, a Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission was established to reveal the nature and eX(e11f 
of gross human rights violations (killing, abduction, torture, and severe ill-
treatment) under apartheid during a prior thirty-four-year period (1 March 
1960 to 10 May 1994), to grant amnesry upon application and ful! disclo-
sure by perpetrators of such politically motivated crimes, and to restore the 
"human and civil dignity of victims" by allowing them to give their own 
accounts and to recommend measures of reparation for them.' While the 
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adjudication of amnesty applications continues, on 29 October I998, the 
TRC released its 3,50o-page final report on human rights violations, which 
found the predominance of violations to have been committed by the state, 
but which also criticized conduct of almost evety gtoup involved in the lib-
eration struggle, including the African National Congress, the party of the 
neW society's first and now retired president, Nelson Mandela.6 
The TRC is striking for the complexity of its design: the moving cere-
mony of public testimonies of both victims and wrongdoers, televised 
around the world; the commitment ro naming and publishing names of 
wrongdoers on the "balance of probability" in light of evidence but with-
out trial; and the right to confer individual amnesties that must be earned 
by wrongdoers' public admissions and full descriptions of their crimes. The 
TRC has power to subpoena people to give evidence, whether or not it in-
criminates them or exposes them to liability (although such evidence is not 
admissible against them in coun), and there is a possibility of criminal 
prosecutions or civil actions against those who do not seek amnesty, or 
whose crimes are judged not political, or who do not tell enough of the 
truth. The TRC confirms the dignity of victims by inviting them with their 
stories into a public-in some cases global-space for validation and sym-
pathy, while its reparation function recommends concrete compensation 
for the victimized, as well as measures to prevent future abuses. 
In other words, significant power was vested in the TRC in order not 
only to find the truth-about the fates of individual victims as well as the 
actions of the South African government and its political opponents-but 
also to fix responsibility by informed judgment and moral standards (rather 
than legal proceedings), to prompt actors to take responsibility for their 
actions, and to impose accountability on them. At the same time, the process 
was designed to show respect to victims in several ways: it mal(es testimonies 
of injury an important public event; it credits testimonies without adver-
sarial proceedings, thus affirming the credibility of testifiers; it allows victims 
and fellow sufferers to participate directly in constructing an official and 
historic record of South Africa's past; it mal(es a reparations scheme an inte-
gral part of the TRC's charge. 
This clearly qualifies as a massive multipronged attempt at moral repair. 
It confirms the agency, responsibility, and dignity of the participants-
victims, perpetrators, and bystanders. It asserts standards of human rights, 
while it publicly models compassion toward both perpetrators and victims, 
"humanizing" the former and consoling the latter. 7 It confirms that there 
are many and grave grounds for retribution but opts officially for reparation 
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r lIS and conciliation, offering itself as a passage to a society of citizens, rather 
than victims and political criminals. Both the broad powers invested in the 
TRC and the wide scope of its aims suggest a great investment of truSt and 
hope in this transitional creature of the new South African democracy. And 
trust and hope are the most fundamental bases for any moral order: truSt in 
a set of shared understandings of what is right and good and in our common 
support of practices that express them; hope that these understandings and 
we who are responsible for supporting them will prove worthy of trust. At 
every stage of the TRC's work, however, almost every facet of this complex 
project has been questioned. 
Since the TRC was established, accusations have recurred that its amnesty 
function subverrs justice. "Justice" here means retributive jmtice: a moral im-
perative of giving people what they deserve for how they have acted, specifi-
cally, returning good for good and evil for evil. Amnesties simply suspend 
retributive justice. Amnesty may be understood to mean that a certain crime 
cannot be punished or is not wonh punishing at the price of something 
else; for this reason, some people oppose amnesties for crimes against humanity 
even when finding them acceptable in some contexts for human rights vio-
lations. Perhaps most resoundingly, in cases where there have been extreme 
and attributable violations of human rights, amnesties are accused of creat-
ing a "culture of impunity," a social presumption that one can get away 
with anything as long as one has a certain kind or amount of power. This, 
in turn, not only fails to provide any deterrent to new or continuing abuses 
but also allows grave evils ro pass unacknowledged or unattributed. Worse 
still, it permits lies and denials to stand or to stand up alongside the claims 
of victims. This humili::ttes vicrims and invalidates their experience; it ignores 
their suffering and rage or relegates it to a private problem." 
The TRC structure mindfully sought to avoid some of the worst features 
of amnesty with the novel idea of making truth the price of amnesty, as well 
as deciding to name names in an ofIidal document, honor victims with 
public acknowledgment and compensation, and clearly reiterate the moral 
line that separates victims from wrongdoers. Yet for all this, the fact remain~ 
that people who have committed brutal and indecent acts will in many case 
be relieved of punishment or penalty, if not of official negative judgment 
For its part the TRC can claim that only a little retributive justice could b 
practically achieved anyway, and that it would occur at a price of preciot: 
resourc::s and political instabiliry. But the TRC can also claim that irs pn 
cess offers kinds of justice that are not retributive. In particular, the TR: 
emphasizes attempts at reparative justice, where the new democratic go 
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ernment, hopefully with support from private money, will offer some kinds 
of compensation ro victims, a gesture with symbolic as well as material 
force. 9 And the TRC ceremonial of public testimonies constituted a novel 
and riveting display of access to the realm of political authority to many 
wronged individuals or their families, whose credibility was honored and 
whose stories entered an official archive, in many cases resulting in public 
identification of wrongdoers and validation of the victims' injuries. This is 
participatory justice, giving opportunities for social participation and civil 
equality in the public sphere to many people who had been denied them. lo 
In the TRC itself, architects and members used and progressively refined an 
ideal of restorative justice, a conception of healing broken relationships that 
focuses on concrete harms to human beings, accountability for wrongdoers, 
and involvement of victims, offenders, and communities together in the 
resolution of conflict and the restoration of harmony. 11 If the TRC may yet 
be said to offer some kind of retributive justice, it can only be on a collective 
scale: it collectively rebukes the white supremacist society whose record of 
human rights violations the TRC has produced. 12 
TRC justice debates raise issues of the role of justice compared to other 
values-truth, equality, dignity, peace, and well-being-and of the role of 
retributive justice in relation to restorative, reparative, participatory, or dis-
tributive justice. If the most primitive meaning of "justice" is a balance or 
equilibrium achieved by keeping things in the proper proportion, then we 
are reminded that moral repair-a process of restoring trust and hope in a 
clear sense of value and responsibility-is likely to involve multiple mea-
sures, both of justice and other than justice, that have to pull together in a 
particular case. They may, however, fail to do so even when intentions are 
for the best. 
The TRC process seems designed with awareness both that different 
kinds of justice delimit each other, and that justice alone in any form is not 
enough. Justice alone-retributive or otherwise-is not adequate to nourish 
all the trust and hope that moral repair needs to create or restore. Beyond 
truth and justice, the TRC clearly aims to heal and to inspire, to uplift partic-
ipants and observers and reconnect its citizens in the plane of equal dignity. 
And here there is another set of perplexing questions about moral repair. 
What repairs moral relations for one party may damage them for another; 
what provides bases for trust or hope for some may necessitate measures that 
inspire fear, resentment, or contempt in others. One way of reconnecting 
people may rule out another. And not everything that repairs people's feel-
ings and relations is a moral repair, however desirable the healing may be. 
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120 Moral repair involves the restOration or reconstruction of confidence, trUst, 
and hope in the realiey of shared moral standards and of our reliability in 
meeting and enforcing them. 
First, let us notice the problem of multiple parties. Most attempts at 
moral repair are bound to tal(e account of, if not directly address, some num-
ber of people affected. While rwo is a minimum in personal cases, even there 
wrongs may afflict or concern others. In a case of social injustice or mass 
violence, of course, many are affected, if not direcdy by the wrongdoing, then 
often by its consequences, including the knowledge that something deeply 
wrong or evil has been done in their society. In fact, in both personal and 
social cases of moral repair one might need to address any of the following 
parties: wrongdoers; victims of wrongdoing; fellow sufferers of wrongdoing; 
accomplices in wrongdoing; beneficiaries of wrongdoing; bystanders (0 
wrongdoing; a specific community housing wrongdoers, victims, or others; 
society as a whole; and in political cases a present or past state apparatus. 
Yet moral repair may not be able to address all of these effectively. Outcries 
against amnesties can be met with claims that the stability and future weH-
being of society require that individual victims and fellow sufferers forego 
retributive satisfactions. It may be argued in return that a state that does not 
show victims or communities that it will witlless, if not punish, wrongdoing 
is discredited. Appeal to the good of society may be seen as threatening, 
rather than reassuring, to vulnerable communities within society that fear 
continuing exposure to humiliation or violence. Assurances or reparations to 
specific communities, on the other hand, often provoke hostility or indigna-
tion, especially if people who consider themselves bystanders feel a reparative 
process assigns them the role of accomplices or beneficiaries. 
Mahmood Mamdani, head of African Srudies at the University of Cape 
Town, suggests a problem of this kind in recent debates on the reconciliation 
process.13 Mamdani notes that unlike in Rwanda, with shockingly many 
perpetrators but few beneficiaries of ethnic slaughtel~ in Soudl Africa through-
Out apartheid there were relatively few perpetrators of the kinds of extreme 
human rights violations the TRC was created to document, but man)' 
beneficiaries, virtually all of white South Africa (RDI). The TRC focus on 
"perpetrators and victims" omits the "link between the perpetrator and the 
beneficiary" (RD2). The TRC thus leaves untouched the "experience of 
apartheid as a banal reality" (RD2) that affected every area oflife crushingly 
:or nonwhites .to the ben~fit .of dle white minority. Worse, the TRC's proceed-
~ngs allow white ~enefi~lan~s of apartheid who were not directly involved 
111 gross human rights Violations the role of an audience indiGnant at these 
b 
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crimes, thereby obscuring their own situation of having benefited from the 
regime dle crimes supported. This aligns beneficiaries with the true victims, 
allowing the beneficiaries not to explore their social responsibility for receiv-
ing benefits through an unjust process supported by them. It further outrages 
the actual victims of both apartheid and other gross human rights viola-
tions because beneficiaries do not feel the need to be forgiven for anything. 
I am not in a position to know the extent to which Mamdani's analysis 
reflects the actual attitudes and reactions of segments of South Africa's pop-
ulation, yet U.S. news media have repeatedly reported significant resent-
ment among white South Africans of the TRC proceedings as a kind of 
"witch hunt" designed to blame white people and make them look bad. 
This realistic example at least illustrates the problems of multiple parties 
and differing relations among them that tax the powers and foresight of 
schemes of moral repair. It is not only that not everything can be done; it is 
that some things can be done only at the price of others. 
There are also questions of what kinds of repair are moral repair, and 
what kinds of moral repair it makes sense to attempt, especially in public 
and large-scale cases. The issues here include what ought to be attempted 
for victims and fellow sufferers, what forms of reconnection should be 
sought or urged, and how the affirmation of truths and moral judgments 
on what has occurred should proceed. 
In Between Vengeance and Forgiveness, Martha Minow notes the "striking 
prevalence of therapeutic language in contemporary discussions of atroci ties" 
and asks, "What is gained, and what is lost, through dle attention to psycho-
logical healing, in contrast wiili gathering facts and securing punishments?" 
(22). Minow reveals how therapeutic and political goals sharply contrast, 
while in practice influencing one another. In a searching chapter on the 
power and limits of truth commissions, Minow, along with many others, 
recognizes that recounting, sharing, and confirming the veracity of painful 
memories of violence and indignity can be a cathartic and healing experi-
ence, but she recognizes the uncertainty of what a limited public process (or 
even moment) of avowal can provide for any victim and the possibility of exploi-
tation of fragile people in a dramatic spectacle. She asserts that "reestablishing 
a moral framework, in which wrongs are correctly named and condemned, is 
usually crucial to restoring the mental health of survivors" (7I). This may be 
true, but what about the reverse relationship: how does the goal of restor-
ing the mental health of survivors bolster the project of moral repair? 
Making services, including therapeutic and medical ones, available to 
victims of mass violence is certainly a humane and socially necessary response 
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that mioht also be considered one kind of reparation, alongside material compen~ation and restoration of civil dignity. But I do not think that ther-
apeutic measures in themselves constitute moral repair. Moral repair requires 
more than reviving capacities for trust and hope in wronged and seared 
souls: it requires good reasons to think that a society is once again worthy of 
trust and hope. This takes social and political transformations, with impor-
tant symbolic aspecrs as well. From the point of view of moral repair, the 
testimony of those wronged in truth commissions, for example, should be 
viewed less in therapeutic terms than in terms of how it represents and respects 
their citizenship, civic dignity, credibility, and moral agency. For this is the 
"reestablishing of the moral framework" of which Minow speaks. 
Nor should we be simply credulous about claims that it is always better 
to tell and to hear, to incorporate the story of your agony or indignity into 
the larger stOlY of your life, even, if! dare say it, that truth and nothing but 
the truth can only set us free. These are things we really do not lmow for all 
purposes and situations about human beings. Many of us with respect to at 
least some situations of terrible violence, incompensable loss, and unreliev-
able anguish have thought what one student of regimes of torture, Lawrence 
Weschler, has stated: "We get the feeling that some places in the world 
could use a bit of forgerring."l o1 Truth commissions have become a feature 
of the landscape of political transition. It will be increasingly important to 
distinguish and assess separately the political fi.lOctions, the moral mean-
ings, and the hopeful therapeutic views of them. It is unwise to accept easy 
analogies or parallels between individual traumas and episodes of political 
terror, even if the latter invariably give rise to the former. 15 
For related reasons it is reasonable to question generalized and orches-
trated invitations to "reconciliation," or even "forgiveness." Notoriously, one 
cannot command forgiveness, nor can one extend it on behalf of someone 
else. A social process of validating inj ury and responsibility for injuring 
may produce aclmowledgment in one sense, establishing the undeniability 
of certain truths. This is no small thing. But this kind of acknowledgment 
need not entail that violators, beneficiaries, or bystanders appreciate the 
suffering of those who have been wronged (Steiner, Truth Commissions 75). 
Those who concede that outrages such as genocide, disappearance, torture, 
or rape as terrorism are totally unacceptable need not, in fact, thereby fully 
acknowledge the d~g~ity aI:d equality of those who have been wronged (29). 
One final crUCIal Issue IS a question of how truth, and what truth, is an 
appropriate vehicle for moral repair. Minow says: "A truth commission is 
charged to produce a public repon that recounts the facts gathered, and 
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render moral assessmenrs .... In so doing, it helps to frame the events in a 
new national narrative of acknowledgment, accountability, and civic values" 
(78).16 A truth commission must indeed establish relevant fact and identify 
wrongdoing clearly as such. Yet the scope and limits of this mandate are not 
completely defined. Jose Zalaquett argues that trllth commissions should 
srick to revealing the facts about secret crimes and setting them in a coher-
ent framework and should avoid engaging in more contentious historical 
interpretations; they should not name names in the absence of due process 
(Steiner, Ti'uth Commissions 15, 19, 58). The TRC was empowered to reveal 
the names of human rights violators, as well as the details of violations. It is 
arguable that a truth commission that addresses the needs of individuals to 
know who ordered and who conducted their torment or the killing of 
those they loved provides a fuller form of moral repair than one that only 
provides the "big picture" of patterns of wrongdoing, especially those of a 
state apparatus of repression. It runs the risk of confirming to victims the 
identities of torturers and murderers who may not be punishable, for lack of 
evidence or reasons of amnesty; but at the same time it opens possibilities 
for other kinds of social censure, exclusion, and reproach that might in 
some cases be powerful weapons. 
Even so, facts in a big picture, including names named, do not necessar-
ilyequal a full-bodied, much less a unique, narrative, and it remains a point 
of contention whether this idea is tenable. A prominent participant in the 
process leading ro theTRC, Andre du Toit of the University of Cape Town, 
says that "it is not clear that a single narrative of reconciliation-a nation-
building narrative-will emerge" (Steiner, Ti'uth Commissions 19). Historian 
Charles Maier doubts that "victim and perpetrator could ever tell the same 
story." He suggests a "contrapuntal history," in which "voices move along 
side by side in relation to one another" (76). Philosopher Yael Tamir thinks 
that in conflicts such as that between Israelis and Palestinians a unified nar-
rative is not a real possibility, and that "abstract acknowledgment of the 
injustice done by both sides" is the surer route to moving forward. She notes 
that the justification of arrangements like truth commissions is usually 
"very contingent on detailed contexts" (74-75). This we might rake as OLlr 
concluding theme. 
A Coda on Jazz 
I want'to say now that the story of the sequel to the killing of Dorcas in 
Toni Morrison's Jazz can be seen as an example, indeed in some ways as 
exemplary, of moral repair: characteristically incomplete and imperfect; in 
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bered but cannot always be fully told; and when told such truths need not 
by themselves account for the mysterious, at times seemingly miraculou~, 
abilities of human beings again to trust and be worthy of trust. But Jazz IS 
also a parable about moral repair. Lee Quinby calls Jazz a "genealogical 
fiction," one that opens closed doors on the past and in the present, acknowl-
edging inconsistencies and surprises in the histories that mal<e people, rela-
tionships, and societies what they are. In doing so, she says, it refutes claims 
to "possess the beautiful theory as a guide toward a reign of piece and har-
mony" (56). It resists closure under illusions that everything can-or has 
already-come out as it must and should be. At the same time, it tests our 
very selective senses of outrage, sadness, sympathy, and justice at others' grave 
injuries. Quinby says Jazz constructs "countermemories" that challenge the 
"concealments of the official, white-supremacist narrative," such as "the 
descriptions recorded in the 'family tree' histories of white U. S. slaveowners" 
(55). These family trees suggest the inevitability of a kind of equation, in 
which two, and only these two, mal<e more. Jazz reminds us how Ii tde justice 
is ever done, or even attempted, where lives have been torn and scorched 
over generations of systemic oppression, with its opportunistic cruelty, its 
deliberately measured negligence, and its tightly managed "truths." Even 
so, Violet and Joe, and Alice and Felice, have their own lives to lead and to 
mend, their own truths to make and face. They, as we all, face their own 
specific tasks of moral repair and will seek justice, revenge, reparation, for-
giveness, peace, reconnection, or lonely solace in such ways as their situa-
tions allow them, when they allow them, to renew hope and trust. 
That is my point about moral repair. We should not think of moral repair 
as something for which there could be such a thing as the-one-beautiful 
theory that s~ecifies always when and whether to punish or pardon or forgive 
or forget. It 15 not an equation in which crime plus correction yields right 
order restored, although we have powerful and not unreasonable needs to 
s~e thil:gs t~at way. What serves better are detailed understandings-prac-
tical, hlstoncal, political, and moral-of the many facets of moral repair as 
they apply to concrete situations. We need to understand kinds of moral 
repair as such within a common perspective that links them to the basic 
ta~k of replenishing the trust and hope on which moral relations depend. It 
:vIl~ ah:ays be the case that the .trust and trust\:yorthiness that need replen-
Ishmg m the wake of wrona do1l1g are those of son1e nllmb f . I b er 0 parncu ar 
~eople whose truths and histories, crimes and injuries, are never actually 
repeatable, even as they beg to be told And we are . . . 
. never 111 pOSItIOnS to 
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begin at the very beginning with utterly fresh pages or perfecdy balanced 
scales. We need lively imaginations but also realism and humiliry about the 
powers and limits of moral repair. 17 
Notes 
1. Toni Morrison's jflzz is cited herein as j. 
2. A good discussion of the deserved ill fate of "rehab iii ration" in the United States 
in the 19605 and 1970s, an approach sunk in psychological speculation, manipulation, 
and arbitrariness, is found in Kathleen Dean Moore's Pardons: justice, Mere» and the 
Public Interest. For an analysis of community conferencing as a productive consensual 
alternative to trial in working with juvenile offenders, see John Braithwaite and 
Stephen Mugford's "Conditions of Successful Reintegration Ceremonies: Dealing with 
Juvenile Offenders." 
3. Interestingly, some cross-cultural research on apology suggests that people in 
the United States and Japan more often choose "responsibility-accepting accounts," that 
is, apologies, for their interpersonal breaches, and that even when excuses are made in 
order to mitigate responsibility there is a strong tendency where damages are not severe to 
accept excuses that are recognizably "standard" in type, regardless of believability. This 
suggests what we all know: jf the stakes are not terrjbly high, and even sometimes when 
they arc, we are willing to bypass punishing or even punitive responses. See Ken-ichi 
Ohbuchi's "A Social Psychological Analysis of Accounts: Toward a Universal Model of 
Giving and Receiving Accounts." 
4. A singular discussion of the problem of the irreversibility and unpredictability, 
the "endlessness" of human action in the world of human affairs, is Hannah Arendt's 
chapter tided "Action" in The Human Condition. 
5. For founding documents related to the TRC, see "Legal Background to thc TRC" 
and "Justice in Transition" booldet at <http://www.truth.org.zallegal/index.htm> 
(20 February 2001). 
6. See thc TRC Website, dmp:/www.truth.org.za> (20 February ZOOT), for Exec-
urivc Summary and Internet Version of the Final Report of 29 October 1998. TheTRC 
continues its rcsolution of amnesty applications as of February 2001. 
7. The "humanizing" phrase is Martha Minow's; see Between Vengeance (wd For-
giveness: Facing History afier Genocide and Mass Violence (78). 
8. A s[fong argument against amnesry in cases of mass violence and political terror is 
made in Aryeh Neier's \.Vtz,. Crimes: Brutality, Genocide, TeI1'OI; and the Stmggle flrjlIStice. 
9. Andrew Sharp provides a suggestive discussion of reparative justice in another 
context in Justice and the Maori. 
ro. In Justice and the Politics of Difference, Iris Young offers a full theory of partic-
ipatory justice. 
II. A version of the TRC Final Report (29 October 1998) is availablc onlinc on the 
TRC official Website, <hrrp:/Iwww.truth.org.za> (20 February 20OT). Fullcr analysis 
can be found in Robert 1. Rorberg and Dennis Thompson's ]i'llth v. justice: The Morality 
ofn·ltth Commissions. See especially the essays by Elizabeth Kiss, Andre du Toit, Alex 
Boraine, Dumisa B. Ntsebeza, and Martha Minow. 
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n. A collection of documems that represems facers of the debate over the justi 
ofTRC's amnesty and other functions is found in Roy L Brooks's \'(Ihen Sorry 1 c: 
. m, 
Enough: The Colltl'ovmy over Apologies and Reparations for Human Injustice. The debate 
continues in Rotberg and Thompson's 'Huth v. Justice. 
13· Professor Mamdani's comments are taken from the transcriptions dlat appeared 
on the TRC Website. The first debate was a TRC Panel Discussion held at the Univer. 
sity of Cape Town, 24 January 1997, transcribed at <hnp:llww\v.umh.org.zaldebatel 
recon.htm> (14 February lOOT). The second debate was a TRC Public Discussion 
"Transforming Society through Reconciliation: Myth or Reality?" held at Cape Town' 
12 March 1998, transcribed at <http://www.truth.org.za/-debatelreco!l2.htm> (14 Febru: 
ary 1999). In the text, I cite these as RDI and RD2, respectively. Summaries ofMamdani's 
smtements appear as of 20 February 200T at <http://www.truth.org.za/medialI99aJ 
9804/ s930421c.htm> and < http:!/www.truth.org.zalmediaIr99819803/S980303c.htl1l> 
See also Mahmood Iviamdani, "Reconciliation without Jusrice," Southem AJi-icall Revi"I~ 
of Books (November/December 1996): 3-5, cited in Chades Villa Vicencio and Wilhelm 
Vervmerd, "Constructing a Report Writing Up the 'Truth,'" in Rotman and Thompson, 
7i-uth IJ. Justice. 
14. Weschler, in Steiner, Truth Commissions I}; see also Tamil' 73. In "Attempts 10 
Amend Human Rights Violations Will Not Alleviate Suffering," Michael 19natieff 
questions whether truth alone may not lock those who perceive themselves wronged 
into an infernal present. 
15. For a useful (but no longer fully current) survey of trmh commissions, which 
have become political institutions in the past quarter century, see Priscilla B. Hayner's 
"Fifteen Truth Commissions-1974 to 1994: A Comparative Smdy." 
16. See also Fr. Brian Hehir, in Steiner, Truth Commissions 22. 
17, Special thanks to David Alliano, Evan Ebe, Jonathan Hogan, and Julianne 
LoMacchio, who spent a semester in my 1999 honors seminar thinking with meaboUi 
alrernative responses to wrongdoing. An earlier version of this paper was written forthe 
David Ringelheim Lectllre at Florida Atlantic University in 1999; 1 thank the university, 
the Ringelheim family, a lively audience, and Robin Fiore, who encouraged me to pur· 
sue this topic for the lecture. Vers'lOns were aho -g;,'{<!.n 2S 2.U Eua A. Hale Lecture at 
Rochester Institute of Technology and as an Austin and Hempel Lecture at DalhollSie 
Universiry. A special thank-you to Katherine Mayberry, in the audience at RIT, who 
disagreed Strongly with my reading of Jazz; I believe she would still disagree, but I have 
revised my reading as a result and learned a great deal in doing so. Thanks also to Wilhelm 
Velwoerd for catching errors regarding the TRC mandate and its members and to 
Martha Minow for reminding me to note the political origins of the TRC. 
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